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Morris Grossman, Art and Morality: Essays in the Spirit of George Santayana, edited by
Martin A. Coleman, New York, Fordham University Press, 2014, 336 p.
1 Morris  Grossman,  who  died  in  2012  at  the  age  of  90,  was  a  rare  combination  of
philosopher, musician, and composer. Inspired by American philosophy, especially the
philosophy of Santayana, he wrote with originality and verve on a variety of topics. As
is  befitting  a  student  of  Santayana,  his  thought  moves  freely  over  the  worlds  of
philosophy, art, music, literature, politics, and religion. The essays in Art and Morality:
Essays in the Spirit of George Santayana, finely edited by Martin Coleman, examine the
many moral and conceptual connections amongst these worlds. 
2 Grossman proposes a central thesis running through his essays. In the Introduction he
tells us: “The intrigue of the art/morality distinction has occurred to me in various,
sometimes strange and trivial, ways” (2). He then offers several examples to illustrate
what  he  means  by  this  distinction.  In  one  example,  whilst  watching  C-SPAN,  a
television channel that broadcasts live feeds from the U.S. Senate, Grossman is struck
by the contrast between the mundane but morally significant motions of government
officials (e.g. calling for quorum) and the classical music added by the cable channel.
The transporting music of Mozart is suddenly the soundtrack for the dutifully working
officials and bureaucrats. For Grossman, this “juxtaposition is aesthetically and morally
provocative,” a “double attentiveness” that he finds pervasive in our life and thought
(2).  It  is  such  brief,  sublime  moments  of  consciousness  –  or  in  Santayana’s  terms,
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‘moments of spirit’ – that Grossman calls to our attention. He writes with a sense of
urgency uncharacteristic in contemporary philosophy. 
In life,  [he tells us],  the choice that [the art/morality] experience embodies and
dramatizes is a relationship that is always with us. Even right now. Especially right
now. Always right now...  [since]  any experience at  any time has equivalent and
searchable parts or moments. (3)
3 However he is not only interested in contrasting moments of moral ‘doing’ with those
of  spiritual  ‘feeling.’  He  is  also  keen  to  stress  the  higher-order  conception  of  the
juxtaposition itself. For the mental act of raising the juxtaposition of doing and feeling
to a level of conscious awareness is itself morally and spiritually significant. Referring
to  the  C-SPAN  example,  he  writes:  “The  juxtaposition  created  by  the  quorum  call
involves us in two distinct awarenesses. It brings together what is not often so vividly
brought together.” He continues: 
But at the same time it makes one aware, despite the juxtaposition, of the enormous
distances between political efforts and actions needed to get things done and the
rare flowerings of “Mozart moments.” (3)
4 In another example, contemplating the adage “It is better to light a candle than to
curse the darkness,” he suggests that better than either alternative is suspending the
call  to  action  and  contemplating  the  alternatives  themselves.  “But  making  the
comparison,  a  meta-action,  might  itself  be  more satisfying than engaging in  either
action,” he writes. 
Comparisons  do  sway  us,  for  better  or  worse,  to  move  from  action  to
contemplation, from deciding what to do to thinking about alternatives. Reflecting
on a choice, to be sure, might help us to make a choice. But it gives us, inevitably, as
a performance choice itself, another matter to reflect upon. It is a further hidden,
and  ongoing,  move  from  the  moral  to  the  aesthetic,  from  the  practical  to  the
theoretical. (7)
5 He maintains that we regularly experience the collision of these two worlds and that
the act of contrasting them is valuable. “If this book were to have a moral point,” he
tells us, “it would be to always remember [the] aesthetic alternative” (9).
6 After the Introduction the book divides into three sections. Part I, “Art and Morality,”
inquires into connections and tensions between the aesthetics of art and imperatives of
morality. The first chapter, “Art and Morality” (1973), sets the stage for much of what
follows. Grossman argues there is no absolute contrast between the business life and
the  enjoyment  of  art,  despite  their  ostensibly  different  goals  and  background
conditions.  Life without art is  condemned as “Movement without direction,  process
without contour, suffering without redemption” (22). On the other hand, to create or
experience art devoid of relevance to life is to 
[…] enjoy without reference to consequences, to be righteous without reference to
joy, to fiddle while Rome burns, and to raise flowers alongside the crematoria. (23)
7 The  second  essay,  “Morality  Bound  and  Unbound,”  carries  these  ideas  over  to  a
discussion about  the moral  obligations  of  both artist  and audience.  When an artist
intends no social or political implications for her creation, the moral drama of the art
(the drama of  a  play,  for  example)  is  called “bound”;  art  with a  moral  message or
prescription is “unbound.” Again, it is not only the distinction between types of artistic
intent  that  interests  Grossman;  it  is  also  the  recognition  of  this  distinction.  “The
tension between boundness and unboundness,  their  pull  in opposite directions,” he
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states, “is the ulterior drama of art. It is implicitly present in the experience of art”
(30); and 
[…]  A  searching  and  ongoing  ambiguity  with  respect  to  boundness  and
unboundness is desirable [since] art enables us to elevate our vision from the drama
of  this  or  that  specific  issue  to  the  larger  drama  of  life  itself,  in  which  the
temptations of art and the stirrings of morality are frozen in an unsettled condition
of dynamic conflict. (31)
8 Grossman’s musical talents add credence to his thoughts on the philosophy of music.
“Music,  Modulation,  and Metaphor” (1980)  is  particularly  fine.  In  it  he attempts to
“develop… an analogy between ‘music  motion’  (i.e.  modulation)  and other  kinds  of
travel,  and seeks to show how the homing instinct animates both life and art.” His
analysis  straddles  “technical  musical  analysis”  (though  still  accessible  to  the  non-
musician) and “the phenomenological  experience of  music” (35).  Like its  sequel,  “A
Mozartian Recognition Scene,” it should appeal to anyone interested in the philosophy
of music. 
9 The remaining essays in Part I further examine the spiritual and moral dimensions of
art. In “A Note on Economy and Art,” Grossman argues that 
[…] Every  instance  of  economy in  art  is  a  kind of  parable  of  the  economic  situation of
scarcity in life, and is aesthetically pleasing because of the deep echoes or urgency
that are apparently awakened. (95)
10 In  “An  Aesthetic  Glance  at  the  Constitution,”  he  trumpets  the  overlooked  “style,
intention,  and  performance”  of  a  political  document  typically  revered  for  its
prescriptions. The moral import of the U.S. Constitution is important, but he argues
that the 
[…]  Constitution  is  not  without  art.  Looking  at  it  aesthetically  –  creatively
misreading it, taking the text for something other than it obviously is – can be a
way of gaining unexpected insights. (98)
11 Similarly, in “Human Rights and Artistic Appreciations” (1979) he attempts an analogy
between (1) the weighty business of justifying human rights and (2) engaging in art
criticism.  As  he  sees  it,  the  two  apparently  distinct  domains  overlap  since  the
articulation and defense of either involves drawing on “shared capacities, perceptions,
responses,  and  attempts  to  gather  them together  in  the  formation  of  a  communal
appreciation or judgment” (112-3).
12 The middle set of essays, “Artistic Philosophers and Philosophical Artists,” looks at the
philosophical  ideas  of  an  eclectic  mix  of  philosophers  and  writers,  such  as  Peirce,
Sartre,  Lessing,  and  Lewis  Carroll.  In  these  essays,  Grossman  continues  to  invoke
“neglected alternatives” and turn over perceived ambiguities.  At times the exercise
feels labored. For instance, in “Interpreting Peirce” (1985), Grossman asks whether the
final  paragraph  of  “The  Fixation  of  Belief,”  in  which  Peirce  (somewhat  painfully)
intones that a man’s chosen logical method should be “loved and reverenced as his
bride,” is a passage intended as “deliberate, total irony,” “partial irony,” “no irony at
all,” or (oddly) “all of the above” (121). Grossman concludes with a note of ambiguity,
commenting that scientific inquiry was Peirce’s “tremulous lady and his immortal
bride, neither and both” (126). Other essays are more compelling. In “How Sartre Must
Be Read”(1968), he takes up the question of how can “the philosopher keep the mind’s
categories from impersonating and parading as nature’s definitive structure?” (134). He
looks to and finds answers in Sartre’s 1948 essay “What Is Writing?.” What he finds is
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an appealing “synthetic procedure” in Sartre’s “making and undermining” of semiotic
and ontological categorical distinctions (134). 
The dialectical dilemmas Sartre gets into [he writes] are more than surmounted by
his  own  larger  awareness  of  these  dilemmas  and  by  the  way  he  exhibits  and
overcomes them in subtle deliberateness of his juxtapositions. (142)
13 The  remaining  essays  in  Part  II,  “On  Beardsley’s  ‘An  Aesthetic  Definition  of  Art’”
(1983);  “Lessing as  Philosophical  Dramatist:  On Nathan the Wise”  (undated);  “Lewis
Carroll:  Pedophile  and/or  Platonist”  (2005);  and  “Brancusi:  Some  Changing  and
Changeless  Perspectives”  (1976),  also  highlight  perceived  tensions  and  connections
with  the  art/morality  distinction.  Grossman  moves  with  impressive  ease  from
discussing  the  poet-philosopher  Gotthold  Lessing  (1729-1781)  to  an  analysis  of  the
aesthetics  of  perspective  in  the  sculptures  of  Constantin  Brancusi  (1876-1957).  His
thought is  often absorbing.  In “Art and Death:  A Sermon in the Form of  an Essay”
(1978), for example, he outlines an “aesthetic theory of death” – a dramatic treatment
of the art/morality distinction.
14 The  essays  in  Part  III  are  on  various  ideas  and  themes  that  are  prominent  in
Santayana’s  philosophy.  In  “Drama  and  Dialectic:  Ways  of  Philosophizing”(1972),
Grossman  argues  that  although  both  expressive  drama  and  logical  dialectic  are
essential to philosophy, 
[…] Too much attempted dramatic volume and variety can lead to irresolution, to
will-lessness,  to excessive chatter and ominous silence.  But too much dialectical
clarity can lead to tidiness at the price of largeness and to precision at the price of
plenitude. (224)
15 He finds support for his view in Santayana’s (neglected) book Dialogues in Limbo (1925),
especially the dialogue “The Vortex of Dialectic.” He explains how 
[…] the choice between drama and dialectic is always with us. At any moment we
can  try  to  clarify  what  we’ve  got,  secure  what  we  are,  put  up  boundaries,
milestones, and markers. This is the role of dialectic. But contrariwise we can try to
extend our domains, become more than we have been, and venture into incertitude
and conflict. This is the role of drama.
16 In Grossman’s estimation, no “philosopher worthy of the name” will lose site of this
distinction or bestow ultimate value on either drama or dialectic (227). 
17 In “Ontology and Morality: Santayana on the ‘Really Real’” (1980),  Grossman argues
that the perennial pursuit of an ultimate or highest form or reality (e.g. Plato’s theory
of  Forms)  should  be  finally  abandoned.  Grossman finds  in  Santayana’s  ontology  of
essence, matter, spirit, and truth, an alternative to pernicious ontological ‘categorical
summitry.’  In his  view, Santayana’s  distinction between the being of  essences (ideal
terms) and the existence of matter (physical things) avoids the pitfalls of rationalistic
views of the universe and provides a more promising approach to ontology. Here his
interpretation may be  overly  influenced by  Buchler’s  notion of  ‘ontological  parity.’
Buchler’s  ontological  parity  is  an  uneasy  fit  with  Santayana’s  ontology.  Although
Grossman is correct in asserting that Santayana did not place any special moral value
on the realm essence or the realm of matter, he is incorrect to suggest, as he seems to
do,  that  there  is  no  ‘primal’  or  logical  order  to  the  realms.  Contrary  to  Buchler’s
ontological parity, all things are not ‘equally real’ in Santayana’s ontology insofar as
essences are eternal, matter is at most everlasting, and spirit and truth are logically
dependent on each. As for prime moral value, a case could be made that this honor falls
to spirit, since for Santayana it is the locus of all value. 
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18 Grossman’s essays on Santayana’s philosophical and literary works are valuable even if
one has doubts, as I do, about his basic interpretation of Santayana’s intentions and
philosophical  system.  Grossman  maintains,  and  he  is  not  alone  in  his  view,  that
Santayana was a supreme ironist who generated “wavering and drama” (244) as he
semi-earnestly delineated a system of ontological categories.  In chapters 19 and 20,
“Spirited Spirituality” (1996)  and “Interpreting Interpretations” (1989),  he discusses
Santayana’s account of the spiritual life and style of philosophizing. Here his theory of
Santayana as ironist comes to the fore. He finds Santayana having a philosophical reach
exceeding  his  grasp;  eschewing  technical  philosophy  in  favor  of  literature;  and
promoting paradoxes. For example, in the Sense of Beauty, Santayana notably defines
‘beauty’  as  ‘pleasure  objectified.’  Grossman  argues  that  “the  phrase  ‘pleasure
objectified’”… is an oxymoron. Pleasure, or emotion, is subjective. What can be seen in
its objective clarity is a term or an essence, which is not the same thing as having a
human emotion… The only way to interpret the blatant contradiction of the phrase
‘pleasure objectified’ (as with the phrase ‘spirited spirituality’) is to see it as a depiction
of an always imperfect process, a human happening that cannot be fully seized” (242).
However this is  not the only way to interpret Santayana’s position. Another way is
Humean: when we see an object we regard as beautiful, we ‘gild and stain’ the object
with  our  sentiments.  The  words  ‘pleasure  objectified’  might  be  prima  facie
contradictory, but the notion of ‘projecting values’ is not obviously contradictory or
ironic.  Similarly,  when Santayana uses  the  phrase  ‘living in  the  eternal,’  Grossman
argues that since it is practically impossible to ‘live in the eternal’ (we have to eat),
Santayana “proclaimed” the phrase “living in the eternal” only “ironically” and rather
intended to promote only “living in pursuit of the eternal” (244). But this critique is a
straw  man,  a  mixing-up  of  definitions,  ideal  ends,  and  practical  realities.  When
Santayana discusses ‘the spiritual life,’ one need not see him as presenting a wholly
unrealistic and therefore ironic philosophy. The spiritual life is an ideal, but it is not
thereby ironic. 
19 The remaining essays in the book, “Santayana’s Aesthetics” (1992), “Santayana’s The
Last  Puritan” (1995),  “Santayana in  California”  (undated),  and “Ultimate  Santayana”
(1992), also look at Santayana’s philosophy from a “tension-filled” perspective of irony.
Referring to Santayana’s book on aesthetics, The Sense of Beauty, Grossman claims that
“Santayana is cavalier about distinctions” (264) and that his treatment of aesthetics is
“fundamentally  critical,  literary,  and  ironic”  (265).  Similarly,  Santayana’s  novel  is
characterized as a “complicated interplay between biography and fiction, and in both
directions it moves away from, and a recovery of, truth” (269); his comments on nature
and the environment are said to “reveal the ongoing play of Santayana’s contradictory
or dramatic attitudes” (280). As for Santayana’s life as a travelling scholar, Grossman
contends that Santayana was a “stranger” to the different “physical and intellectual”
worlds in which he lived and that “This profound and tension-filled double locus of his
affiliations is the story of his life and work” (281).
20 Much of Grossman’s writing is faithful to the letter and spirit Santayana’s philosophy.
His  restatements  of  Santayana’s  ideas  are  often  eloquent  and  he  casts  interesting
sidelights on Santayana’s views. He is a bit of a provocateur, challenging the reader to
reconsider assumptions and arguments that might be taken for granted. However, his
sense of irony can also feel one-dimensional: an “idée fixe” that he acknowledges in the
book’s  introduction  (14).  Still,  Grossman  expounds  his  views  on  Santayana’s
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philosophy, and his other chosen subjects, with clarity and conviction. He also invites
the reader to see things in a particular way and with a spirit of free inquiry. For these
reasons he successfully presents his essays “in the Spirit of George Santayana.”
AUTHORS
GLEN TILLER
Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi
glenn.tiller[at]tamucc.edu
Morris Grossman, Art and Morality: Essays in the Spirit of George Santayana
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VII-1 | 2015
6
